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LEGAL ACCEPTANCE OF ACCOUNTING 
PRINCIPLES IN GREAT BRITAIN 
AND THE UNITED STATES: 
SOME LESSONS FROM HISTORY 
Abstract: This paper examines and contrasts nineteenth century 
case law in Great Britain and the United States in which courts 
had to decide whether to accept accounting concepts having to do 
with making provisions for depreciation, amortization and deple-
tion. It should be emphasized that the courts were not arguing 
about accounting theory, per se; they were deciding particular 
disputes, which depended on the meaning in each case of profits. 
By 1889, when Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Company was decided, 
British courts had rejected accepted fixed asset accounting con-
ventions in determining profits in tax, dividend, and other cases 
while United States courts accepted these conventions, except in 
the case of wasting asset companies. This historical contrast is of 
particular interest because a recent reversal of these countries 
legal stances has occurred through legislation. In the United 
States, the Revised Model Business Corporation Act and the 
legislatures of several states have now rejected accounting con-
cepts of profit as the legal test for dividends and other shareholder 
distributions. The reasons for this rejection appear to be similar to 
those used by the British Court of Appeal nearly 100 years ago. In 
Great Britain, on the other hand, the 1980 Companies Act reverses 
much of the Lee case and places on accountants new respon-
sibilities for determining whether company distributions to 
shareholders would violate the capital maintenance provisions of 
the act. 
Almost 100 years ago, in 1889, the British Court of Appeal 
decided Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Company1 and this case con-
tinues to be cited by accountants interested in the development 
of thought. The Lee decision is frequently interpreted to mean 
that companies are not required to make provisions for depre-
ciation, but the debate over the meaning and significance of 
this case is not over [Morris, 1986]. 
Lee was the culmination of a series of nineteenth century 
legal cases in Britain where courts had to decide whether to 
1Case citations are contained in the Table of Cases in the References. 
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accept particular accounting techniques for fixed assets in the 
formulation of legal rules defining profits. At this same time, 
legal doctrines often taking a different view were developing in 
the United States. It should be emphasized that the courts were 
not arguing about abstract accounting theory in these cases. 
They were concerned with resolving disputes between par-
ticular parties and a variety of equitable considerations influ-
enced their decisions. However, because the litigants' rights 
and obligations depended on the meaning of profits and in-
come, the courts had to determine what principles of profit 
measurement should apply in the particular case. 
The purpose of this paper is to compare these nineteenth 
century British and United States legal cases in which methods 
of accounting for fixed assets were first debated. The legal rules 
which emerged then endured for almost 100 years but are now 
the subject of renewed debate. In both Great Britain and the 
United States legislation was enacted in 1980 which reverses, 
in part, that country's century-old legal rules and adopts, in 
part, the other country's. A historical analysis should enlighten 
our understanding of these recent developments and the nature 
of the legal concern about certain accounting concepts. It also 
provides the opportunity to look at rule-making in accounting 
in a broad historical context. 
The British cases concerning accounting for fixed assets 
will be discussed first, followed by American developments. 
Then a postscript describes and contrasts recent legislative 
developments in Great Britain and the United States. 
THE BRITISH CASES 
It is frequently stated that the 1889 case of Lee v. Neuchatel 
Asphalte Company broke with prior British law, in which the 
"capital maintenance doctrine" prevailed (see e.g. Robson 
[1927, p. 266]; Yamey [1941, p. 278]; and French [1977, p. 322]). 
A brief review of these early cases on capital maintenance is 
followed by: a discussion of British tax cases which considered 
the deductability of expense due to depreciation, amortization 
and depletion. These early cases set the stage for the Lee 
decision. 
Pre-Lee British Legal Cases 
The British legal cases decided before Lee are discussed in 
Reid [1987a, 1987b]. Although no consistent concept of profit or 
depreciation emerged, these cases tend to support the view that 
British courts prior to Lee required the adoption of accounting 
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methods which provided for capital maintenance. Early on, the 
courts held that dividends were payable out of profits, and 
could not be paid from capital [MacDougall v. Jersey Imperial 
Hotel Co., Ltd. (1864)]. In some cases, the balance sheet surplus 
test was said to be the appropriate concept for determining 
profits, see, e.g. Binney v. Ince Hall Coal and Cannel Company 
(1866) and Helby's Case (1866). Holdings and dicta stated that 
assets which had been stolen [Henry v. The Great Northern 
Railway Company (1857)], destroyed [Stringer's Case (1869)], or 
became irrecoverable [Flitcroft's Case (1882)], needed to be 
accounted for. Support also was given for making provision for 
the depreciation of fixed assets [Rishton v. Grissell (1868); Mills 
v. Northern Railway of Buenos Ayres Company (1870); Lord 
Rokeby v. Elliot (1878, 1880); Davison v. Gillies (1879); and 
Kehoe v. The Waterford and Limerick Railway Company (1888)]2 
and the amortization of leases [Riston v. Grissell (1868)]. How-
ever, not all decisions were in accord.3 Thus while the capital 
maintenance doctrine seemed fairly well established by these 
cases, it was not well-defined. 
In this same period, other British courts considered the 
question of accounting for fixed assets in income tax cases. 
Here the courts largely rejected the application of accounting 
techniques which called for deductions for depreciation, deple-
tion and amortization. These cases contrast with the pre-1889 
decisions involving private parties, where different considera-
tions appear to have prevailed. 
Rulings in Pre-Lee British Tax Cases4 
Generally, the British courts were zealous in protecting the 
Crown's revenue. In Addie and Sons v. The Solicitor of Inland 
Revenue (1875) a coal mining company claimed that it ought to 
be allowed a deduction for expenditures on pitsinking and for 
depreciation of machinery and plant. The court disallowed the 
deduction (p. 432) and said that expenditures on developing a 
2But see Dent v. The London Tramways Company (1880), where a company 
was required to pay preferred stockholders dividends out of the current year's 
profits, after taking account of depreciation for the year, although in prior 
years insufficient depreciation reserves had been established and, therefore, 
capital was impaired. 
3See, e.g Lambert v. Neuchatel Asphalte Company (1882), which involved 
the same company as the later Lee case. 
4British tax case citations were found in Mew's Digest [1884; 1898] under 
the heading "Revenue — Taxes and Duties." 
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mine are assets and "must be placed to capital account in any 
properly kept books." 
Similarly, in F order v. Handyside and Co. (1876) a deduc-
tion for depreciation of machinery was not permitted and the 
court said the depreciation was like an accrual for future 
repairs. The Income Tax Act did not permit deductions for 
repairs in excess of the average amount expended in the three 
previous years.5 The court noted that when the company sub-
sequently made repairs "perfect justice would be done . . . and 
the deductions which the company now claim would in the 
long run, be allowed them" (p. 65). The court also refused with 
some "reluctance" to allow an insurance company to deduct 
estimated claims noting that they could be deducted when paid 
[The Imperial Fire Insurance Company v. Wilson (1876)]. The 
reason was that any estimate of risk would be speculative and 
could result in the company reporting no income (p. 273). This 
decision was in sharp contrast to the case law where directors 
were required to take account of pending risks in determining 
divisible profits.6 
However, the Knowles v. McAdam (1877) decision permit-
ted a company to deduct as an expense leasehold amortization. 
Here, a colliery company had claimed a deduction for depre-
ciation, determined by a revaluation and allegedly caused by 
the year's coal depletion and lease expiration.7 While the court 
said that the deduction was misnamed "depreciation," it fo-
cused on the lease amortization and did not actually decide 
whether an owner of a mine, as opposed to a lessee, could 
deduct depreciation (p. 29): 
Suppose a man pays 1000£ for a lease of the mine for 
one year only. At the end of the year he has got all 
the coal in the mine and sold it for 1200£, the 
expenses of labour and materials being 100£. Is his 
profit 1100£? It would be an abuse of language to say 
so. His profit is what remains in his pocket after 
deducting the expenses, namely 1000£ for the liberty 
to get the coal and 100£ for the cost of getting it. 
The decision involved a number of issues. In particular, the 
tax act prohibited deductions on account of "diminution of 
5Income Tax Act of 1842, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 35, Schedule D, sec. 100, Rule 3. 
6See e.g. Rance's Case (1870) 
7The amount claimed was less than provided by a straight-line amortiza-
tion of the leasehold property, which cost 717,421 pounds and had an average 
of 32 years to run. 
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capital,"8 but the court decided that this provision did not 
apply. It relied on Lord Cairns' statement in Gowan v. Christie 
(1873)9 who seemed to view a mineral deposit as inventory: 
"What we call a mineral lease is really, when properly consi-
dered, a sale out and out of a portion of land." 
In 1878, the British Income Tax Act was amended to 
permit deductions for depreciation due to wear and tear,10 
further indicating acceptance of the acountant's concept of 
profit. 
But, in Coltness Iron Company v. Black (1881) the House of 
Lords reversed this incipient trend.11 Lord Blackburn called 
the Knowles decision, where the court treated 32-year leases 
like an inventory of coal "startling." 
The effect of this would be that though the mines 
were worked so as to produce a large profit above the 
working expenses, yet if they were worked by a 
purchaser who had overestimated the value of the 
minerals, and paid such a price for them that he was 
a loser, no income tax was to be paid in respect of 
those mines. That is a result which never could have 
been intended by the Legislature, and . . . it seems to 
me a reductio ad absurdum . . . " (p. 338) 
8 Schedule D, Section 159 provided that " . . . it shall not be lawful to make 
any other deductions therefrom than such as are expressly enumerated in this 
Act; . . . nor to make any deduction from the profits or gains arising from any 
property herein described . . . . on account of diminution of capital employed or 
of loss sustained in any trade . . . " 
9This case considered whether a tenant had the right to abandon a lease 
because it was unprofitable. Lord Cairns said there was no way to determine 
whether it was a profitable lease: "[H]ow would it be possible at the end of the 
third or the fourth year of the lease, to speculate as to what the profit or loss 
would be if it were spread over the whole period of the lease. How can you at 
the end of the third or the fourth year of the lease tell what the price of labour 
may be in future years; or what machinery may be introduced in future, which 
may dispense to a certain extent with labour; or what the market value of 
minerals of the same kind will be at a future period, or what the effect upon the 
market value of those minerals may be of the discovery of other minerals of the 
same kind in the same neighbourhood. All those things are perfectly uncertain" 
(p. 284). 
10Customs and Inland Revenue Act of 1878, 41 Vict. c. 15, sec. 12. Depletion 
and leasehold amortization were not separately mentioned. 
11 In an 1880 case, Watney and Co. v. Musgrave, the court held that amorti-
zation of a pub lease was not an expense of a brewery, since buying up pub 
leases was not the business of a brewery. Although the judges admitted the 
similarity to advertising expense, in that this practice increased trade, they 
were not sure that advertising expense would be deductable either. 
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In Coltness expenditures on a mine were capitalized and 
then allocated to the cost of production. Earl Cairns (p. 324) 
and Lord Blackburn (p. 339) thought that this method allowed 
the "owner of a mine [to] . . . manipulate his accounts . . . "12 
This concern about manipulation had also been expressed in 
other cases involving deductions for noncash expenses.13 
Equity among taxpayers also was considered. Both Lord 
Penzance and Lord Blackburn felt that the Income Tax Act, as 
it applied to mines, was a form of property tax. As in the case 
of other property subject to taxation on its value, its cost (and, 
by implication, accounting techniques to amortize that cost) 
was irrelevant. In effect, Blackburn commented that cost and 
accounting concepts of income often are disregarded in deter-
mining income taxes and the situation here is no different (p. 
336): 
It has also been sometimes argued that it is very 
unjust to tax at the same rate a terminable interest, 
such as that in a mine, which must at some time be 
worked out, and a fee simple interest, which will 
endure so long as this world continues in its present 
state . . . . There is much force in the argument on the 
other side, that if the interest is terminable, so is the 
tax . . . . [T]here can be no doubt that the same an-
nual charge is imposed upon a terminable annuity 
and on one in perpetuity; and, what seems harder, 
that the same annual charge is imposed upon a 
professional income, earned by hard labour, often 
extending over many years before any return is got, 
and, when earned, precarious, as depending on the 
health of the earner.14 
12It is unclear from the facts given whether the company was guilty of 
manipulating its accounts to the detriment of the tax assessor. The company 
claimed a deduction for pitsinking of £9,927; the company's total expenditure 
on pits still in operation was £97,537. Its earliest working pit was opened in 
1849. Over the 20 year period from 1858 to 1878, pitsinking expenditures 
amounted to £165,825 and pits were exhausted during the period on which 
£102,678 had been expended. For the six years from 1872 to 1878, costs were 
£71,965 and pits exhausted in these years had cost £44,013. 
13Interestingly, Pixley [1881] was published the year Coltness was decided 
and he also viewed mines as relatively permanent property. Pixley thought 
that the purchase of a mine was similar to the purchase of a business; the good 
will or "purchase of business" asset would be good "So long as the Company is 
prosperous" (p. 146). Pixley did recommend that, instead of dividing all its 
profits, the company "raise" a sinking fund to write off this asset if its cost 
exceeded its realizable value (p. 147). 
14This anology involving the depreciation of human capital is occasionally 
alluded to in the literature. See e.g. May [1943, p. 27]. 
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The final consideration in Coltness involved the need for 
certainty in collecting taxes. Deductions for noncash expenses 
introduced the possibility of tax avoidance. As Lord Blackburn 
pointed out the "object of the [framers of the Income Tax Act] 
is to grant a revenue at all events, even though a nearer 
approximation to equality may be sacrificed in order more 
easily and certainly to raise that revenue . . . " (p. 330). 
Thus, concerns about taxpayer manipulation of noncash 
expenses, equity in the treatment of taxpayers, and a desire for 
certainty in revenue collections appeared to motivate these tax 
cases. However, before 1889 the tax cases were different than 
those where courts were called upon to determine income or 
profits for other purposes. Then, in 1889, the Court of Appeal 
decided Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Company and it shocked the 
accounting world. 
Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Company (1889) 
The Neuchatel Asphalte Company's major asset was a 
terminable concession to work a mine. A shareholder claimed 
that dividends could not legally be paid until two conditions 
were met; first, the company must own net assets equal in 
value to the nominal (par) value of its outstanding shares; and 
second, "depreciation" of the concession had to be provided 
for. 
The first condition is rarely mentioned in the literature. 
The complaining shareholder was arguing, in effect, that the 
stock was watered. In the Chancery Court, Judge Stirling con-
cluded that the company need not accumulate assets equal in 
value to the stated capital before it paid dividends since "In my 
opinion, the capital of the company at the time of its formation 
really consisted of the aggregate of the assets taken over from 
the various selling companies . . . " and the plaintiff had not 
proved that these assets had depreciated in value (p. 9). 
Of the three judges on the Court of Appeal, only Cotton 
commented on this aspect of the case. He noted that the share 
purchase contract had been duly registered and, on that basis, 
he also disagreed with the shareholder's first claim. In Britain 
legislation required companies to register contracts to sell 
shares for property (instead of cash) with the Registrar of Joint 
Stock Companies.15 Before Lee the courts had refused to enter-
tain complaints that the property was not worth the nominal 
value of the shares provided these registration requirements 
15Companies Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 131, s. 25. 
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were met.16 As a result, nominal capital might bear no relation 
to the value of the company's assets, but it was believed that 
full disclosure would protect creditors and investors. As Sir 
George Jessel noted in Andersons Case (1877), subsequent cre-
ditors "were told exactly what it [the property] was" (p. 102) 
which served as security for their advances. Then in Lee the 
court took the next step in refusing to require the company to 
make up the difference between nominal capital and asset 
value before paying dividends. 
Since the intrinsic value of assets received in return for 
shares has no necessary relationship to nominal value, the 
accounting convention calling for a regular provision for de-
preciation is more difficult to justify. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that the Court of Appeal in Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte 
Company also disagreed with the shareholder's second claim 
that a regular provision for depreciation was required. 
Although the initial valuation of the company's property 
might have concerned accountants, it was the second issue that 
provoked the great debate among them [Brief, 1976], fueled by 
a number of the judges' comments, including Cotton's state-
ment that "[t]here is no . . . necessity . . . to set apart every year 
a sum to answer the supposed annual diminution in the value 
of this property from lapse of time" (p. 18) unless required by 
contract. Like Stirling in the lower court, Cotton was per-
suaded by the fairness of the directors' determination that 
there were profits because additional advantageous terms had 
been obtained from the grantor and, therefore, the concession 
was worth more than when it was acquired. This suggests that 
in Cotton's view capital, meaning the value of the assets ex-
changed for shares, should be maintained in some fashion, 
although an honest valuation was all that was required. 
But the other two judges on the Court of Appeal, Lord 
Justices Lindley and Lopes, rejected this notion of capital 
maintenance and its underlying balance sheet test of profita-
bility. Moreover, although both comment on wasting asset 
companies, neither seems to rely on any attributes peculiar to 
capital in these companies. Thus, Lindley said (p. 20): 
It is obvious with respect to such property, as with 
respect to various other properties of a like kind, 
mines and quarries and so on, every ton of stuff 
which you get out of that which you have bought 
16See e.g. Pell's Case (1869); Anderson's Case (1877) and In re Ambrose Lake 
Tin and Copper Mining Company (1880). 
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with your capital may, from one point of view, be 
considered as embodying and containing a small 
portion of your capital, and that if you sell it and 
divide the proceeds you divide some portion of that 
which you have spent your capital in acquiring. It 
may be represented that that is a return of capital. 
All I can say is, if that is a return of capital it appears 
to me not to be such a return as is prohibited by law. 
This type of comment in Lee has led many to believe that 
the court decided special rules applied to wasting asset com-
panies. But this reading of the case is too narrow. For Lindley 
also said (p. 22): 
[T]he Companies Acts do not require the capital to be 
made up if l o s t . . . . [S]uppose a company is formed 
to start a daily newspaper; supposing it sinks 
£250,000 before the receipts from sales and adver-
tisements equal the current expenses, and supposing 
it then goes on, is it to be said that the company 
. . . cannot divide profits until it has replaced its 
£250,000, which has been sunk in building up a 
property which if put up for sale would perhaps not 
yield £10,000? That is a business matter left to busi-
ness men. 
Although this statement broke from the traditional "capital 
maintenance" view found in earlier dividend cases, in that it 
would permit the payment of dividends when capital was 
impaired, the statement probably would not, in itself, have 
caused great concern among accountants. 
But in Lee the company's articles of association specified 
that dividends were payable out of profits, and courts in many 
previous cases had held that dividends were payable out of 
profits whether or not such a private contract existed.17 Al-
though Lindley recognized that "if you want to find out 
. . . whether you have lost your money or not, you must bring 
your capital into account somehow or other" (p. 23), he seems 
to be saying that dividends could be paid if cash receipts from 
operations exceed disbursements (p. 24) without providing for 
depreciation. 
Lopes explicitly said this and defined the excess of receipts 
over disbursements as "current annual profits" (p. 26): 
17The earliest case which claimed the payment of dividends presupposed 
profits was an 1849 House of Lords case, Burnes v. Pennell. 
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The capital and the revenue accounts appear to me 
to be distinct and separate accounts, and, for the 
purpose of determining profits, accretions to and 
diminutions of the capital are to be disregarded. 
These statements embroiled accountants since the determina-
tion of "profits" was thought to be their special domain. Thus, 
Cooper [1894, p. 1039] said: 
The question seems to have been really, Was there 
profit? The only way of ascertaining this is by an 
account . . . . Then why should not Accountants have 
been called, to tell the Court how, in practice, ac-
counts are prepared? An Accountant would have 
explained to the Court the impossibility of preparing 
a Balance Sheet to show profit without allowing for 
waste . . . 
And although accountants had argued that certain types of 
' 'fluctuations" in the value of long-term assets should be ig-
nored, they almost all believed that depreciation should enter 
into the calculation of profits. 
The Court of Appeal's strained definition of capital and 
profits permitted the Neuchatel Asphalte Company, within the 
constraints of existing case law, to pay a dividend. The court 
justified its decision on two grounds. First, Lindley noted, in 
terms reminiscent of his earlier treatise [1881, p. 791], the 
disagreement regarding what were assets and what were ex-
penses, and reiterated in Lee his opinion that "What is to be 
put into a capital account, what into a revenue account is left 
to men of business" (p. 21). Thus profits could not be defined 
and capital bore no necessary relationship to the value of a 
company's property. Second, capital and its maintenance were 
irrelevant to the company's ability to pay creditors. According 
to Lindley, "The capital may be lost and yet the company may 
be a very thriving concern . . . . If they [business men] think 
their prospects of success are considerable, so long as they pay 
their creditors, there is no reason why they should not go on 
and divide profits . . . " (p. 22). The court thus applied a liquid-
ity standard based on surplus cash receipts for dividends18 
which protected creditors but did not "paralyze the trade of 
the country" (p. 19). This contrasted with prior law, where 
capital maintenance rules were considered a creditor protec-
18French [1977, p. 319ff] also suggests that the Court of Appeal in Lee was 
adopting a solvency test for dividends, which takes into account liquidity and 
outstanding debts. 
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tion. Lindley rejected this notion of capital, which he said was 
not mandated by Parliament, and he noted that the Companies 
Acts did not even require a company to be wound up if it lost 
its capital. 
Further light is shed on the Court of Appeal's reasoning in 
subsequent cases in the "Lee series."19 In particular, the lack of 
relationship between capital as a residual equity claim and 
underlying asset values and the importance to creditors of 
solvency rather than capital are emphasized. For example, in 
Verner v. The General and Commerical Investment Trust Ltd. 
(1894), Lindley observed that there was no legal requirement 
that "the capital must . . . be represented by assets which, if 
sold, would produce it." Thus it is noted that capital was not 
equivalent to liquidation value of assets. It was in this case that 
the Court distinguished fixed and "circulating" capital20 and 
held that losses of fixed capital (here a large decline in market 
value of securities) need not be made up before paying di-
vidends. Although Lindley observed that "capital lost must not 
appear in the accounts as still existing intact; the accounts 
must show the truth, and not be misleading or fraudulent," he 
also observed that the Companies Act did not require that 
accounts be kept at all! Again the court emphasized the com-
pany was not insolvent (p. 463). 
Thus, by 1889 the British courts rejected what were consi-
dered at the time, and are now considered to be, accepted fixed 
asset account conventions in determining income available for 
dividends and taxable income. However, Parliament over-
turned some of these court decisions by permitting a deduction 
for depreciation in determining taxable income. These British 
decisions contrast with developments in the United States at 
19See e.g. Verner v. The General and Commercial Investment Trust Ltd. 
(1894); Bolton v. Natal Land Co. [1892]; Bosanquet v. St. John D'El Rey Mining 
Co. (1897); In re National Bank of Wales [1899], affirmed sub. nom. Dovey v. Cory 
[1901]; and Ammonia Soda Co. v. Chamberlain [1918]. 
20Although Lee is frequently cited as the first case in which (counsel) 
distinguished fixed and circulating or floating capital (see, e.g. Palmer [1912, p. 
884]), the term "floating capital" had been used in at least two prior House of 
Lords cases, both involving questions of apportionment of income between life 
tenants and remaindermen: Irving v. Houston (1803) and Bouche v. Sproule 
(1887). The term was also used in several prior dividend cases: Stevens v. The 
South Devon Railway Company (1851) (shareholder sues to have dividend 
enjoined while large "floating" unsecured debt is unpaid); City of Glasgow 
Bank v. Mackinnon (1882), and In re Oxford Benefit Building and Investment 
Society (1886). 
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this time, where, except for cases involving wasting assets, the 
court decisions were more consistent with accounting conven-
tions. 
THE UNITED STATES CASES 
A number of legal cases arose in the United States in the 
nineteenth century in which courts were called upon to decide 
profits available for dividends, the amount due employees or 
other creditors under profit sharing arrangements, or taxable 
income.21 Of course, no single legal rule has ever existed in the 
United States. Each state legislature is free to enact its own 
laws and each state court can develop additional common law 
rules. New York enacted one of the earliest statutes governing 
dividends in 1825 and declared it unlawful for directors to pay 
dividends except from the "surplus profits arising from the 
business."22 According to Kehl [1941, p. 12], this statute, more 
than any other, influenced the development of dividend legisla-
tion in the United States. The Massachusetts statute of 1830 
was also influential. It imposed personal liability on directors 
who declared dividends when the company was insolvent or 
would be rendered insolvent or bankrupt by virtue of the 
dividend.23 Other states adopted rules against capital impair-
ment.24 Where such statutes existed, they did not define the 
content of the terms profit and capital and, therefore, courts 
were required to do so in concrete cases. 
As in Britain before Lee, American court decisions in the 
nineteenth century supplemented this legislation and generally 
held that dividends could not be paid unless there were profits 
[Morawetz, 1882, p. 346; 1886, p. 410; Munson, 1891, p. 193; 
Cook, 1903, p. 1162; Kehl, 1941, p. 22, 23]. According to many 
authorities, the protection of creditors was a primary motiva-
tion for these rules [see. e.g. Kehl, 1941, p. 17] although dis-
senting shareholders also are occasionally mentioned as parties 
in need of protection [Morawetz, 1886, p. 411]. 
21American cases were located through a search of a number of treatises on 
corporation law, including Grant [1854], Potter [1881]; Morawetz [1882, 1886]; 
Taylor [1884], Boone [1887], Clark and Marshall [1902] and Cook [1903]. A 
number of articles and books about accounting and dividend law also were 
searched, including Reiter [1926], Annotation [1928]; Weiner [1929], Briggs 
[1934], Kehl [1939, 1941]; Berle and Fisher [1932], and Hills [1954a; 1954b]. 
22New York Laws 1825, c. 325, sec. 2. 
23Mass. Laws, Jan. Sess., 1830, c. 53, sec. 9. 
24This statutory pattern is discussed in Reiter [1926, p. 103ff]. 
12
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 15 [1988], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol15/iss1/1
Reid.: Legal Acceptance of Accounting Principles in G.B. & the U.S. 13 
The determination of profits available for dividends or for 
other purposes required rules for valuing assets. Of particular 
interest are cases which raised issues of expense recognition 
due to depreciation and depletion. American case law on this 
topic was not uniform, but, by the late nineteenth century, 
legal acceptance of what today would be called the "going 
concern" convention was widespread, except in the case of 
wasting asset companies. The American cases on wasting asset 
companies will be discussed after those which established the 
general rules governing accounting for fixed assets. 
Recognition of Depreciation 
In several early American cases, courts stated that depre-
ciation was not an expense. These included Tutt v. Land (Geor-
gia, 1873), and two United States Supreme Court cases, Eyster 
v. Centennial Board of Finance (1876) and United States v. 
Kansas Pacific Railway Company (1878). The Supreme Court 
comment in Eyster was representative: " . . . according to the 
common understanding, [net receipts] ordinarily represent the 
profits of a business" (p. 503). In other cases courts disallowed 
depreciation for the purposes of determining dividends, appar-
ently because the assets had been maintained through repairs, 
additions and improvements [Park v. Grant Locomotive Works 
(New Jersey, 1885) and Mackintosh v. Flint & Pere Marquette 
Railroad Co. (C.C. E.D. Mich., 1888)]. 
However, some courts decided deductions for depreciation, 
broadly defined, were proper. Thus in Meserve v. Andrews (Mas-
sachusetts, 1871) the court determined that loss caused by fire 
was deductable in determining profits under a lease. State 
savings bank legislation applicable in In re Provident Institution 
for Savings (New Jersey, 1878) required the bank to establish 
reserves to meet any contingency or loss . . . from the deprecia-
tion of its securities or otherwise" (p. 6). And for tax purposes, 
the Supreme Court of the United States decided that deprecia-
tion in the value of investments in bonds and stock and in the 
value of track was deductable in Little Miami & Columbus & 
Xenia Railroad Company v. United States (1883). The court 
commented that "The law evidently contemplated an annual 
statement of accounts, and in this way an annual striking of 
balances between gains and losses" (p. 279). 
In later cases depreciation tended to be equated with loss 
due to wear and tear, as in Conville v. Shook (New York, 1893), 
which involved determining compensation under an employee 
profit sharing plan. In Whittaker v. Amwell National Bank (New 
13
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Jersey, 1894) the court found that machinery and real estate 
should be valued at cost less depreciation for wear and tear, 
the appropriate charge to be determined through experience. 
However, the concept of depreciation also was associated with 
a valuation process and in Hiscock v. Lacy (New York, 1894) the 
court decided buildings and real estate should not be depre-
ciated below their real value to deprive a minority shareholder 
of dividends. 
Depreciation also was an issue in several cases which 
involved whether public utility rates were set so low as to 
involve an unconstitutional taking of property without just 
compensation. Although a California court, in San Diego Water 
Company v. City of San Diego (California, 1897), held that 
depreciation was not a deductable expense, later rate cases 
held otherwise. In a United States Supreme Court case, San 
Diego Land and Town Company v. National City (1899), it was 
held that "annual depreciation of the plant from natural causes 
resulting from its use" (p. 757) ought to be taken into account 
when rates were fixed. Other cases, e.g. Milwaukee Electric 
Railway & Light Co. v. City of Milwaukee (C.C. E.D. Wisc., 1898), 
were in accord. 
Courts also permitted companies to make deductions for 
the amortization of franchises and other contracts in a rate 
case, Milwaukee Electric Railway & Light Co. v. City of Mil-
waukee (C.C. E.D. Wisc., 1898). 
Thus by the late nineteenth century, some agreement ap-
peared to be developing in both federal and state courts that 
depreciation was a deductable expense. However, the concept 
of depreciation was not uniform; some courts viewed deprecia-
tion as an allocation of costs and others saw it as a valuation 
procedure. This contrasted with the case law on depletion. 
Depletion: The Wasting Asset Doctrine 
United States legal doctrine concerning depletion appears 
to have originated in two early Pennsylvania tax cases, but 
these decisions were inconsistent with a Pennsylvania dividend 
decision, Ford v. Locust Mountain Coal Co. (1868). In Ford a 
lower court decided that a coal company could, and probably 
must, establish a sinking fund for depletion of coal deposits. 
Otherwise, the public would be deceived about the value of the 
stock and insiders, who understood that dividends were being 
paid out of capital, would be able to benefit by selling their 
shares to unknowledgeable investors. 
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But the Pennsylvania tax cases took another position. In 
Commonwealth v. The Ocean Oil Company (1868) an oil com-
pany claimed a deduction for oil depletion for income tax 
purposes. The trial court instructed the jury that such a deduc-
tion was permissable, provided the jury found the oil deposit 
was exhaustible: the "jury should act on reasonable prob-
abilities, . . . taking into account the time that it will probably 
take to exhaust the capital . . . " (p. 62). 
However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed this, 
noting that "the capital of oil companies is generally nominal" 
(p. 63). But the nominal value was neither the aggregate price 
paid for its shares nor the cost of its land and under these 
circumstances, no deduction for depletion was allowed. 
Further clarification of this position was forthcoming in 
Commonwealth v. The Penn Gas Coal Company (Pennsylvania, 
1869), where a coal company claimed a deduction for "waste of 
capital for coal taken out" (p. 241). The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court explained that taxes would be wrongfully avoided if this 
deduction were allowed. 
All capitals of mining companies, whether of coal, 
iron, copper, or tin, or silver or gold, and so of 
quarrying companies, whether of stone, marble or 
slate, are nominal, like those of petroleum com-
panies, and fixed by their promoters at such large 
figures, that, by applying the principle contended for 
by the appellees, the whole annual income would 
have to be retained to supply the loss of capital, 
which would disappoint the stockholders of their 
dividends, and the state of her taxes (p. 242). 
Other courts also pointed out that capital in mining com-
panies was stated at a nominal value, and as the California 
court in In re South Mountain Consolidated Mining Company, 
Bankrupt (1881) concluded, "It neither bears nor is intended 
nor supposed by the public to bear the slightest relation to the 
real value of the property — a value nearly always conjectural, 
and very often imaginary" (p. 33). The appellate court agreed 
(1882) and held that purchasers of shares in mining companies 
did not expressly or impliedly agree to pay the nominal value 
of the shares in cash or property.25 The court also commented 
25In other companies shareholders had to pay the nominal value of the 
shares in money or property whose value equaled the nominal value of the 
shares. The practical impact of the distinction between mining and other 
companies in cases where property (instead of cash) was exchanged for shares 
was reduced by the majority rule that good faith director valuations of 
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on the inherent problems of valuing mines: "Little is known of 
its real value. It may be worth nothing; it may be worth many 
millions" (p. 367). 
These American cases, all of which preceded Lee (1889), 
appear to be the basis for the American legal rules on ac-
counting for fixed assets of mines and valuation of property 
exchanged for shares of mines. 
COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND UNITED STATES 
NINETEENTH CENTURY RULES 
In his influential work on corporate law, Morawetz [1886]26 
summed up his view of American accounting rules for fixed 
assets in terms of two related principles which today would be 
called "going concern value." First, (Vol. I, p. 414), 
The right of a corporation to declare dividends can-
not be determined by reference to the market value 
of the company's shares, or the price for which the 
assets could be sold. . . . 
[T]he property acquired for permanent use in 
carrying on business, may be valued at the price 
actually paid for it, although it could not be sold 
again except at a loss. And even although the busi-
ness of the company should prove less profitable 
than was anticipated, and the value of the whole 
concern, and consequently of the shares representing 
it, should greatly depreciate in actual value, it would 
not be necessary to accumulate the profits until the 
depreciation had been made up, and the value of the 
shares again raised to par. All that is required is, that 
the whole capital originally contributed by the 
shareholders be put into the business and kept 
there . . . . 
The second point concerns the distinction between external 
and internal depreciation: 
property exchanged for shares were conclusive, although in a minority of 
states, where the "true value" rule was adopted, those valuations were subject 
to review. See, e.g. Reiter [1926, pp. 95ff). 
26According to Ames [1887] who reviewed this book in the first issue of the 
Harvard Law Review, it was generally conceded to be the best contemporary 
treatise on the subject of corporations. Morawetz published the first edition of 
this treatise in 1882, when he was 23 years old. He appeared to have embarked 
on this project because he was unsuccessful in finding employment upon his 
graduation from Harvard Law School. Bibliographical material about 
Morawetz can be found in Swaine [1946]. 
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If the capital of a company . . . is invested in machin-
ery, land, or fixtures used in carrying on its business, 
the machinery, land, or fixtures may be valued at 
their original cost, provided they be kept up in their 
original condition. 
Any depreciation of the value of the company's 
property resulting from the uncertainty of the 
speculation in which the company has embarked, or 
from a failure to carry on business profitably by 
reason of the state of trade, or similar causes, may be 
disregarded; but any depreciation caused by design, 
accident or wear and tear in using the property, 
should be made up out of the earnings before any 
dividend is declared. 
These views, while similar to those held by British accountants 
like Guthrie [1883] and by some British courts before Lee, are 
in sharp contrast to those in the Lee series of cases, which 
applied to mining and other companies and did not require 
provision for either internal or external depreciation. 
Legal rules like those in Lee applied in the United States 
only to wasting asset companies. Morawetz's explanation of the 
special rules for mining companies often has been reflected in 
the literature: 
The capital of a mining company is not designed to 
be used, like that of a banking or manufacturing 
company, in carrying on business permanently. The 
working of a mine necessarily causes it to become 
exhausted and to depreciate in value, and this depre-
ciation cannot be repaired. There would be no object 
in accumulating the money obtained by the company 
through working the mine, so as to keep up the 
original amount of capital. It is implied from the 
character of the speculation of a mining company, 
that the income derived from working the mine shall 
be distributed among the shareholders as dividends, 
after deducting the expenses, and making reasonable 
provision for contingencies (p. 415).27 
27Morawetz's reasoning in part echoes that of an early British case involv-
ing a mine, Binney v. Ince Hall Coal and Cannel Company (1866). There Vice 
Chancellor Kindersley, influenced by Adam Smith, determined that waste 
needed to be provided for in determining profits. However, he permitted this 
joint stock company to return capital to its members. The rationale was that 
"It would be extremely detrimental to the shareholders if they were compelled 
to keep up a larger capital than they wanted to work with, or than they could 
safely employ" (p. 367). This company did not enjoy limited liability and 
therefore the customary prohibition against the return of capital to sharehol-
ders did not apply. 
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The nineteenth century developments in Britain and the 
United States described here suggest that courts in these coun-
tries had very different ideas about the role of accounting in 
formulating legal rules on profits. The Lee cases were pro-
foundly influenced by Lord Lindley, whose views can be traced 
to his 1860 treatise on the law of partnerships and companies. 
Lindley may have been influenced by economists, as Edwards 
[1939, p. 181] suggests, or by accountants themselves. As Gower 
[1954, p. 112] pointed out, "Accountants . . . had their own 
notions including the division of assets into fixed and circulat-
ing and the non-revaluation of the former." 
Nevertheless, nineteenth and twentieth century accoun-
tants alike have condemned the Lee decision. Discussions con-
temporary to Lee in the British periodical The Accountant 
claimed the decision showed a "feeble grasp of the fundamen-
tal principles of accounting,"28 and was "utterly at variance 
with the views of all practical accountants and prudent men of 
affairs" [Payne, 1892, p. 143]. That journal also denounced the 
judgment as "the most mischievous which has ever been given 
in relation to company matters" [Weekly Notes, 1889, p. 149]29 
Pixley [1906]30 claimed that Lee set "a suicidal policy" regard-
ing dividend payments, "contrary to the practice of soundly 
managed public companies." And Morris [1986, p. 72] quotes 
other critical 19th century British commentary. 
Some British legal scholars who were contemporaries of 
Lindley also criticized this decision. Palmer [1898, p. 147], an 
important authority on British company law, lamented: "The 
extraordinary laxity in regard to the ascertainment of profits 
which these decisions countenance, and apparently legalise, 
goes far to render the salutary rule, that dividends must not be 
paid out of capital, illusory." However, not all British legal 
scholars of the time were so critical. In an 1889 "Note" in the 
Law Quarterly Review the idea was advanced that Lee had to do 
with the doctrine of laissez-faire, and that this case freed 
businessmen from unnecessary constraints. 
Lawyers, even since the days of Lord Mansfield, have 
been too apt to apply a Procrustean formula to mer-
chantile as well as political operations. Happily the 
good sense of modern judges has done much to re-
move the reproach. Business men may grumble at 
28Cited in Hatfield [1916, p. 205] 
29This remark is quoted in Yamey [1941, p. 279]. 
30These remarks are quoted in Hatfield [1916, p. 214]. 
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the law's delay, but they can no longer complain of 
its technicality or of being confined in the strait-
waistcoat of a legal formula . . . . [Lee] will meet with 
the approval of the commercial and legal world. 
This idea has been picked up by subsequent United Kingdom 
economists and lawyers. For example, Yamey [1941, p. 278] 
stated that Lee resulted in "leaving accounting matters to 
businessmen." Johnston [1961, p. 545] agreed that this case had 
to do with "profits [being] a matter of internal management." 
And more recently French [1977, p. 322] also concluded that 
the judges in this case gave 
full reign to the notion that . . . economic freedom 
shall prevail. In doing so they have largely disre-
garded the conventions of profit measurement used 
by accountants, but it would have been pointless for 
them to have broken the fetters of the capital 
maintenance doctrine only to have another set of 
arbitrary constraints imposed in their place. To their 
credit the judges have steadfastly refused to let this 
happen, helped no doubt by the unimpressive figure 
the accountant has cut in the dividend case. 
In the United States, on the other hand, Lee was cited in a 
number of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Ameri-
can court cases as the "leading authority" for the wasting asset 
doctine.31 These cases also cited Morawetz [1886]. However the 
earlier Pennsylvania tax cases were not cited there or in the 
extensive commentary on the wasting asset doctrine since this 
time. 
Some of the American commentary on Lee also adopts the 
view that this case established the wasting asset doctrine in 
Anglo-American law. For example, Saliers [1916, p. 33], an 
early authority on depreciation, wrote that "corporations en-
gaged in mining are exceptions to the rule that the investment 
must be kept from diminishing" and he cited Lee as authority. 
Morris [1986], p. 77] has more recently suggested that English 
lawyers and companies immediately after Lee also believed 
that this decision applied only to wasting assets companies and 
that this decision did not retard the adoption of depreciation 
accounting in general. 
31 Excelsior Water and Mining Company v. Pierce (1891); People ex. rel. 
United Verde Copper Co. v. Roberts (1898); Boothe v. Summit Coal Min. Co. 
(1909); Mellon v. Mississippi Wire Glass Co. (1910); Van Vleet v. Evangeline Oil 
Co. (1911); and Stratton's Independence v. Howbert (1912). 
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Nevertheless, although Lee was often cited as the source, 
the legal doctrines which became dominant in the United 
States were first developed by American courts and later expli-
cated by Morawetz [1886]. Slowly the wasting asset exception 
was written into the corporation codes of a majority of the 
states after it appeared in the Uniform Business Corporation 
Act (1928),32 which in turn was apparently influenced by 1927 
Delaware legislation.33 
Later American commentary recognizes that Lee and the 
subsequent Court of Appeal cases go further than was origi-
nally thought and suggest in general that depreciation need not 
be accounted for.34 This later American discussion tended to be 
critical of the Lee decision. For example, Street [1930, p. 239] 
commented that Lord Lindley's argument that profits were the 
source of dividends although capital had been lost was "not 
free from sophistry." And Ballantine and Hills [1935, p. 253] 
said that "with all deference, the English courts seem 
hopelessly 'thing minded' in their ideas about capital." The 
American wasting asset doctrine was also considered question-
able by many Americans [see, e.g. Ballantine, 1931, p. 465], but 
it was, in any event, an exception, not the general rule. 
POSTSCRIPT 
The fallout from the Lee case has now stopped in Britain 
where the 1980 Companies Act35 overturned much of the 1889 
32 Section 24(IV). Drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws and approved by the American Bar Association at its 1928 
meeting. By 1935, eight states permitted wasting asset companies to distribute 
net proceeds without allowance for depletion [Ballantine and Hills, 1935, p. 
240, n. 82]. By 1946, 17 states had such provisions [Grimes, 1946, p. 206], by 
1960, 30 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico did [Model Business 
Corporation Act Annotated, 1960, p. 688], and by 1966 five additional states 
were added to the roster [Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, 1960, 
1966 Pocket Parts, pp. 246ff]. 
33Delaware General Corporation Law, Sec. 34, March 1927. This legisla-
tion, in turn, apparently was adopted to upset a Delaware court decision which 
rejected the wasting asset doctrine, Wittenberg v. Federal Mining & Smelting Co., 
(1926). 
34See e.g. Annotation [1928, p. 42], where it is noted that the "wasting 
assets doctrine appears to be but one application" of the English rule dating 
from Lee that "capital assets which are impaired or lost need not be replaced in 
order to justify the payment of dividends out of the revenue account." 
35The provisions of the 1980 Act are now consolidated in the Companies 
Act, 1985. 
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decision. This legislation makes capital a cornerstone of inves-
tor and creditor protection. In particular, public limited com-
panies are required to have a minimum capital of £50,000 [ss. 
117, 118] and independent persons qualified for appointment 
as auditors [s. 108(1)] must make valuations of any property 
exchanged for shares [s. 103(l)(a)]. Moreover, capital cannot be 
eroded by distributions to shareholders. A dual profits/capital 
impairment test appears to govern the legality of such distribu-
tions. Distributions cannot be made except out of profits [s. 
263(1)] which are defined as a company's accumulated, 
realized profits, less its accumulated, realized losses [s. 263(3)]. 
Thus, current profits cannot be distributed, as English law had 
held since Lee, without regard to accumulated past losses. In 
addition, public limited companies cannot make distributions 
if the result would be to reduce the value of the assets below 
that of the liabilities and capital [s. 264(1)]. The Act still does 
not require that depreciation be provided for, although it does 
provide that any reserves or provisions for depreciation are to 
be treated as realized losses [s. 264(2)]. 
Most significant is the fact that whether the profits/capital 
impairment tests have been met is to be determined with 
reference to relevant accounts [s. 270; 271] accompanied by an 
auditor's opinion [s. 271(3), (4)] in which the auditors are 
required to report whether the distribution would violate the 
Act. Thus the act relies on accounting and auditing to meet its 
objectives. 
The British Companies Act of 1980 was adopted at least 
partially to implement directives of the European Economic 
Community and make minimum capital requirements uniform 
throughout the Community [Hare, 1980a, p. 503]. But the 
changes also are responsive to much of the accounting profes-
sion's criticism about the Lee cases since they were decided and 
are consistent with recommendations advocated by the Jenkins 
Committee on Company Law of 20 years earlier [Hare, 1980b, 
p. 586]. 
However, in the United States the rules adopted in Lee v. 
Neuchatel Asphalte Company have now begun to find favor 
among the organized legal profession and the legislatures of a 
number of states. The Model Business Corporation Act was 
amended in 1980 and the amendments abandon the traditional 
tests for dividends, based on earned surplus and prohibiting 
capital impairment, and retain a single test based on sol-
vency.36 Dividends are prohibited when a company is insolvent 
361969 Model Business Corporation Act, sec. 45, amended by financial 
provisions, 34 Bus. Law. 1867 (1979), adopted, 35 Bus. Law. 1365 (1980). 
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by virtue of lack of liquidity, i.e. inability to pay debts as they 
come due [s. 6.40(c)] or insolvent in the bankruptcy sense that 
total liabilities (not including capital except where shares have 
preferential rights on liquidation) exceed total assets. These 
financial provisions were included in the Revised Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act (RMBCA) of 198 437 and have already been 
included in the corporation codes of at least eight states.38 In 
two other states, Massachussetts and California,39 an insol-
vency test was adopted preceding the 1980 amendments. Ex-
perience with the original Model Act suggests that these new 
financial provisions will eventually be adopted in many more 
states. 
In contrast to the 1980 British amendments, directors, not 
independent auditors or appraisers, are to be the valuers of 
property exchanged for shares [RMBCA s. 6.21 (a)]. Moreover, 
the act specifically refuses to adopt generally accepted ac-
counting principles, although these may be used if "reasonable 
in the circumstances" [RMBCA, s. 6.40(d)] to test the legality of 
distributions. Instead, the Revised Model Act would look to 
businessmen for judgments about the important issues of valu-
ation and liquidity. This is exactly what many have said the 
Lee case did. 
While the accounting profession appears to be regarded 
with a new esteem in Britain, the American drafters of the 
RMBCA do not rely on accounting conventions to determine 
important issues of valuation and creditor protection. The 
official comments to the RMBCA note that in practice the 
traditional dividend tests, based on profits and capital im-
pairment, have not worked and that shareholders have been 
able to make whatever distributions they wanted (RMBCA, 
Official Text, p. 123). The official comments (pp. 125ff) lay the 
blame for that failure on accountants. Thus the controversy 
surrounding the periodic revisions of generally accepted ac-
counting principles is noted, and it is concluded that director 
"reasonableness" establishes a better legal standard than ac-
counting: 
37Adopted by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corpora-
tion, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association. 
38Those states are Illinois [Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, Ch. 32, Bus. Corp. Act, s. 
9.05]; Indiana [Burns Ind. Statutes Annotated, Title 23, ss. 1-28-1 through 
1-28-5]; Minnesota [West's Minn. Stat. Annotated, Vol. 20, s. 302A.551]; Mon-
tana [Montana Code Annotated, Vol. 35, ss. 35-1-711]; New Mexico [Michie's 
New Mexico Statutes Annotated, Chapter 53, ss. 53-11-44]; South Carolina 
[South Carolina Code, ss. 33-9-260]; Virginia [Michie's Virginia Code, ss 13.1-
653]; and Washington [Washington Revised Code Annotated, ss. 23A.08.420]. 
39West's Annotated California Corporation Code, ss. 500 - 503. 
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The widespread controversy concerning various ac-
counting principles, and their continuous reevalua-
tion, suggest that a statutory standard of reasona-
bleness, rather than of generally accepted accounting 
principles, is appropriate . . . . . 
Section 6.40(d) specifically permits determina-
tions to be made . . . on the basis of a fair valuation 
or other method that is reasonable in the cir-
cumstances. Thus the statute authorizes departures 
from historical cost accounting and sanctions the use 
of appraisal methods to determine the funds availa-
ble for distributions. 
With some irony, the official comments in connection with 
the RMBCA resound of the reasoning of Judge Lindley in the 
Lee case. Lindley also felt that capital impairment rules did not 
protect creditors because capital lacked defined meaning. He 
also believed liquidity, not capital impairment, was a better 
test of the validity of a dividend. Other judges were suspicious 
of basic conventions like matching of revenue with expenses, 
which they said could lead to the manipulation of accounts. 
More fundamentally, it was recognized that much of what 
influences market value is not reflected in the accounts. 
Littleton [1933, p. 214] argued that the development of 
accounting conventions was spurred by the necessity of deter-
mining profits available for dividends and much has been 
written about these developments. Now, after 100 years of 
experience, the American Bar Association Committee on Cor-
porate Laws and some state legislatures have apparently con-
cluded that accounting conventions do not matter for this 
purpose. This attitude may reflect a struggle for political power 
between the legal and accounting professions. Or it may reflect 
more fundamental questions about the objectives of accounting 
from the perspective, at least, of one important set of users. 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper, there appears to 
be a growing interest in the interaction of legislation and 
judicial decisions in the evolution of legal rules on accounting 
and further research which chronologically traces this evolu-
tion, beginning with the legislation cited in this paper and the 
cases in the Table, might shed further light on the process of 
rule-making in accounting. In the 100 years which have elapsed 
since the legal decisions discussed here, complex social and 
economic developments have undoubtedly affected the recent 
developments in the law of accounting. This paper is one 
element in that story. However, the question of why the ac-
counting profession in Great Britain has been given greater 
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legal responsibilities while the opposite seems to be occurring 
in the United States remains an issue which should concern 
accountants and therefore merits further study. 
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